The Impact of Government-Sponsored Training Programs on the Labour Market Transitions of Disadvantaged Males by Thierry Kamionka & Guy Lacroix
The Impact of Government-Sponsored Training










The analysis focuses on an examination of the impact of government-sponsored train-
ing programs aimed at disadvantaged male youths on their labour market transitions. The
richness of the data at our disposal allows us to recreate very detailed individual histo-
ries over a relatively long period. As many as seven distinct states on the labour are be
identiﬁed in the data.
We use a continuous time duration model to estimate the density of duration times
in these seven states, controlling for the endogeneity of an individual’s training status.
We investigate the sensitivity of the parameter estimates by comparing a typical non-
parametric speciﬁcation with a series of parametric two-factor loading models, as well as
a parametric three-factor loading model.
Our results show that young, poorly educated males who participate in welfare train-
ing programs do far worse on the labour market than those who do not participate. Par-
ticipation in the Job Re-Entry Program (JRP), a distinct welfare training programs, yields
better results in terms of employment. Our estimates clearly indicate that participants in
JRP and those in welfare training programs are distinct groups.
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The impact of government-sponsored training programs has been extensively studied in the
past couple of decades.1 In many countries, such programs have become an integral part of
public policies aiming at enhancing self-sufﬁciency among vulnerable groups. The program
costs have escalated as they have become more comprehensive and more systematically used.
Not surprisingly,policymakershaveshownrenewed interest in obtainingaccurate and reliable
estimates of their efﬁcacy.
The discussions surrounding the efﬁcacy or desirability of training programs rest on com-
plex methodological issues. The main concern lies with proper treatment of an individual’s
decision to participate in such programs. Severe biases may arise if unobserved individual
characteristics that affect the decision are somehow related to the unobservables that affect the
outcome of participation. Two approaches have been proposed in the evaluation literature to
address the so-called issue of “self-selection”. The ﬁrst is the “experimental approach”, based
on random assignment of applicants into treatment or control groups. The second is the “non-
experimental”, or “econometric approach”, and relies on non-random samples of participants
and non-participants. Each approach tackles the self-selection issue from a different angle,
but the relative merit of each is still the subject of debate [see Heckman and Smith (1995),
Burtless (1995), Ham and LaLonde (1996)].
Mostwouldarguethatthe“experimental”approachisbestsuitedtoeliminateself-selection
biases and provide adequate mean program impacts, however measured. Yet, recently this
view has been challenged by Ham and LaLonde (1996) in their important paper. In essence
they argue that random assignment between control and experimental groups provides an ad-
equate short-term mean program impact. On the other hand, the treatment and controls ex-
periencing subsequent spells of employment and unemployment are most likely not random
subsets of the initial groups because the sorting process is very different for the two. In other
words, random assignment does not guarantee that long-term mean program impacts are void
of any systematic biases.
In most countries, experimental evaluation of training programs is impracticable due to a
lack of appropriate data. Analysts must instead concentrate either on survey or administra-
tive data, and rely on multi-state transition models. An additional difﬁculty in using these
data is that program participation must be modeled explicitly. Many recent papers have nev-
ertheless managed to successfully model complex transition patterns using such data (Gritz
(1993), Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon (1997) and Mealli, Pudney and Thomas (1996)). Most
papers are limited to three separate states of the labour market: employment, unemployment
1See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) for a recent and detailed survey.
1(nonemployment) and training.2 In many cases data limitations do not allow identiﬁcation of
any more states. In other cases, analysts purposely focus on few states to keep the statistical
model tractable. Indeed, when the data is drawn from stock samples, as is often the case when
using administrative data, the statistical model must account for so-called “initial conditions”
problems. This usually adds considerablecomplexity toan alreadyinvolvedstatistical model.3
Many have questioned the appropriateness of focusing of few labour market states (Heckman
and Flinn (1983), Jones and Riddell (1999)). It may be even less appropriate to focus on few
states when considering the impact of training programs.
This paper investigates the impact of government training programs aimed at poorly edu-
cated male welfare recipients. It should be stressed at the outset that in Canada, as in many
European countries, the welfare system aims at supporting individuals without income and
who are not entitled to any other social security beneﬁts, irrespective of age.4 As such, it
acts as a safety net for unemployed workers who do not qualify for beneﬁts, or who have ex-
hausted their unemployment beneﬁts. Many programs are available to assist these long term
unemployed and those with few skills increase their employability. Understandably, a con-
siderable proportion of program resources has been targeted towards the youths in the past
decade. Yet, many have questioned the ability of traditional programs to address the problem
[OECD, 1998]. The aim of this paper is precisely to investigate the impact of these programs
in enhancing the self-sufﬁciency of young males welfare claimants, a particular disadvantaged
group (see Beaudry and Green (1997)).
The empirical strategy is similar to that used by Gritz (1993) and Bonnal et al. (1997) in
that we explicitly account for selectivity into the training programs. It relies on a rich dataset
that tracks the transitions of a large number of young Canadian males on a weekly basis across
seven different states of the labour market. These states include employment, unemployment,
welfare, out of the labour force (OLF), two separate welfare training programs, and unem-
ployment training programs. In all, as many as 24 different transitions are allowed in the
model. The sample is drawn from the population of welfare recipients that experienced a spell
at any time between 1987 and 1993 in the province of Québec, Canada. To be included in the
sample, individuals had to be aged 18 or 19 at any time during that period and to have less
2One notable exception is Bonnal et al. (1997) who consider as manyas 6 different states: permanent employ-
ment, temporary employment, publicpolicyemployment(training), unemployment,out-of-labour-force(nonem-
ployment), and an absorbing state (attrition).
3Two biases are likely to result from stock samples: (1) length-bias; (2) inﬂow-rate bias. The former may
arise because lengthy spells are more likely to be ongoing at the time the sample is chosen. The latter is related
to the fact that the probability of being sampled is related to the probability of starting a fresh spell at time the
sample is chosen. See Gouriéroux and Monfort (1992) and Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994) for a
detailed analysis.
4Individualsmustbe agedover18 toqualify for beneﬁts, althoughsingle parents lessthan 18may stillqualify.
2than a high-school degree. Sample stratiﬁcation is used to avoid over-parameterization of the
statistical model that would result if too many exogenous variables had to be controlled for.
By merging various administrative data ﬁles we can recreate complete individuals’ histo-
ries on the labour market back to age 16, the legal school-leaving age in Canada. Consequent-
ly, each individual in our sample is necessarily observed in the OLF state at the beginning
of his history. This sampling scheme thus removes the necessity to control for stock sample
biases and has the additional beneﬁt of providing rich transition patterns over a relatively long
sample frame.
The econometric model is built on continuous labour market transitions processes and
allows entry rates into each state to depend on observed and unobserved heterogeneity com-
ponents. Heterogeneity terms can be destination-speciﬁc, origin-speciﬁc or both. In all cases,
correlation across heterogeneity terms is allowed. We further investigate the sensitivity of the
parameter estimates to various distributions of the heterogeneity components. When paramet-
ric distribution functions are used, the model is estimated by Simulated Maximum Likelihood
(SML) methods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed descrip-
tion the data. Section 3.1 discusses the econometric model and the various statistical assump-
tion regarding the distributions of the heterogeneity terms. Section 4 reports our empirical
ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Data Description
The basic data used for this study are drawn from the caseload records of Québec’s Min-
istère de la Solidarité sociale. The ﬁles contain information on all individuals having received
welfare beneﬁts at some time between January 1987 and December 1993. In particular, the
start dates and end dates of each welfare and welfare training spells are recorded in the ﬁles.
The welfare program contains special provisions for those who are indisposed for work due
to mental or physical reasons. These individuals are not included in the sample. Thus the
ﬁnal sample comprises only individuals having no handicap or only a minor, intermediate, or
temporary physical handicap. Furthermore, they are ﬁt to work.
The welfare administrative ﬁles contain no information on employment or unemployment
spells. Our sample was thus linked to the Status Vector ﬁles (SV) and the Record of Employ-
ment (ROE) ﬁles, both under the aegis of Human Resources Development Canada. These ﬁles
contain very detailed weekly information on insured unemployment spells and employment
spells, respectively. The start dates and end dates of each spell are recorded in these ﬁles. Sim-
ilar information is available with respect to training spells administered under the UI program.
3Merging all three administrative ﬁles allows us to deﬁne seven different states on the labour
market. Aside from the welfare, unemployment and employment states, we can identify two
separate welfare training states and one unemployment training state.5
The focus of this paper is on poorly educated young men. Thus to be included in the
sample, an individual had to be either 18 or 19 years of age at any time between 1987 and
1993 and have less than 11 years of schooling overthe sample period. A high-school degree in
Québecusually entailsat least 12yearsof schooling. In principle, then, none of the individuals
in our sample has earned a high-school diploma. With these selection criteria the ﬁnal sample
contains 3068 individuals.
The upper panel of Table 1 provides summary statistics for individuals who have not par-
ticipated in a training program. The lower panel presents similar statistics for program partic-
ipants. In the latter case, the mean durations in either employment, unemployment or welfare
are calculated both before and after participation. An examination of the table reveals that
the two groups are very similar in terms of their observable characteristics. Yet, there are sig-
niﬁcant differences in their respective labour market experiences. For instance, non-trainees
have longer employment and OLF spells than trainees, and have shorter spells in both welfare
and unemployment. On the other hand, the average duration of employment, unemployment,
welfare and OLF spells decreases signiﬁcantly following training. On the whole, the average
proportion of time spent employed by trainees and non-trainees is remarkably similar.
Recall that only individuals who experienced a welfare spell between 1987 and 1993 and
who were aged 18 or 19 during that period are included in the sample. Those who are 18 or
19 years of age in January 1987 may have already been on the labour market for 2–3 years
at most. In order to recreate their complete labour market histories as of the age of 16, it is
necessary in some cases to go back in the ﬁles as early as January 1984.6 The start date and
end date of each spell is used to create individual histories on the labour market. Overlaps
between states are frequent and are not necessarily the result of coding errors. It may well be,
5The welfare ﬁles contain information dating back to 1979 and ending in December 1993. The SV ﬁles
contains information beginning in January 1987 and ending in December 1996. Finally, The ROE ﬁles contain
information ranging from January 1975 to December 1996. The analysis focuses on the 1987–1993 period due
to data limitations.
6Dataconcerning unemploymentspells isavailable onlyasofJanuary 1987. Consequently,asmallproportion
of unemployment spells occurring prior to 1987 may be wrongly coded as OLF. Two factors lead us to believe
that the proportion of such spells is likely insigniﬁcant. First, the large majority of individuals that were 18 or
19 years of age in the years 1990 and beyond where in the OLF, the employment or the welfare states between
16 and 19. Second, of those individuals, the majority who had an employment spell would not have qualiﬁed
for UI beneﬁts given the eligibility rules that prevailed between 1984 and 1987. Similarly, employment spells
that were ongoing in December 1993 will not show up in the ROE ﬁles until they are terminated. To avoid
misclassifying these spells as OLF, the ROE ﬁles are searched as late as December 1996. Given the average
length of employment spells reported in Table 1, it is very unlikely that many employment spells will be wrongly
coded as OLF.
4for example, that a welfare spell and a work spell overlap. Program designs do not forbid this.
In principle, such overlapscould be redeﬁned as a separate state. Giventhe number of possible
states, it is simply not reasonable to allow these overlaps in the analysis. It was decided that,
as a rule, starting dates would have precedence over ongoing spells. Thus an ongoing spell
with known end date is truncated whenever a new state starts prior to the end date.7
The 3068 individuals in our sample experienced as many as 31422 spells over the sample
period. Table 2 presents all the transitions that occurred at any given point in the sample
period. The table identiﬁes seven separate states on the labour market. Welfare Training
includes various job search assistance programs as well a skill enhancing programs aimed at
welfare recipients. The Job-Reentry Program (JRP) is an on-the-job training program also
aimed at welfare recipients. Under this program, participants do not receive beneﬁts but a
(subsidized) salary from a regular employer.8 JRP is treated separately because contrary to
other programs most participants qualify for unemployment beneﬁts upon completion. UI
is a state in which individuals receive unemployment beneﬁts. Individuals that do not work
and that do not qualify for beneﬁts are treated as OLF for the purpose of this study. It must
thus be kept in mind that UI is not necessarily akin to unemployment in the usual sense. UI
Training comprises a series of training programs aimed at UI claimants. The Out of Labour
Force (OLF) state is the complement of all other states. It may include full-time students,
non-entitled unemployed individuals and individuals that are truly out of the labour force.
Table 2 reveals interesting dynamics on the labour market. For instance, the majority of
welfare spells end either in employment, in welfare training or OLF. Likewise, welfare train-
ing spells end either in welfare, in employment or in OLF. Interestingly, most JRP participants
enter regular employment upon completion of their program. Very few enter UI even though
most qualify for beneﬁts. Other transitions are as expected, except perhaps for UI training.
Indeed, the majority of participants return to UI upon completion of their program and very
few ﬁnd regular employment. A number of cells contain few or no observations. The empty
cells are consistent with program or policy parameters that prevent a number of transitions to
occur or are a consequence of our deﬁnitions of the various states.9 Only transitions compris-
ing more than 50 observations will be considered in the econometric model. This leaves a
total of 24 transitions to be modeled explicitly.
7Preliminary analysis was also conducted giving the end date precedence over the start date of a new spell.
The resulting transitions matrices and average durations are very robust to this strategy.
8Non-proﬁt organizations have to pay a symbolic 1$ per working day. The participants receive regular bene-
ﬁts.
9For example, the welfare ﬁles provide information on a monthly basis. Any interruption lasting between
1-3 weeks will not be recorded in the data. The record will show an uninterrupted sequence of monthly beneﬁts
receipt. Thus Welfare-Welfare transitions are not identiﬁable in the data. On the other hand, UI spells are
recorded on a weekly basis. Unemployed workers that work a number of weeks or hours while claiming beneﬁts
may qualify for additional beneﬁts once they exhaust their original entitlement. The SV ﬁles will indicate a new
UI spell starting the week following exhaustion. Thus UI-UI transitions are identiﬁable in the data.
5The transitions on the labour market have three essential dimensions: the state of origin,
the state of destination and the duration in any a given state. Table 2 provides useful informa-
tion on the ﬁrst two dimensions. One way to represent all three dimensions simultaneously
is to look at the distribution of the sample across all seven states on a weekly basis. This
distribution synthesizes both the transitions across states and the mean duration in each.
Figure 1 plots the proportion of individuals in each of the seven states on a weekly basis.
The top portion of the ﬁgure traces out the proportion of individuals in non-training states
(welfare, unemployment, employment, OLF), and the bottom portion traces out the propor-
tions in training states (UI training, welfare training and JRP). There are two distinct features
that arise in January 1987 in the top portion of the ﬁgure. First, the proportion of individualsin
OLF is relatively high. This partly reﬂects a cohort effect. In January 1987, our sample com-
prises only individuals that are 18 or 19 years of age. Not surprisingly, a large proportion of
them are either still in school or have not yet entered the labour market. As we moverightward
along the time axis, these individuals become older and new 18-19 year old entrants join the
sample. By the time we reach December 1993, the oldest individuals are between 25–26 years
of age. It does not necessarily follow that the sample’s average age increases systematically
along the time axis. Proportionately more individuals have entered the sample in the recession
years 1989–1992 than previously. Second, the proportion of unemployed individuals is zero.
As mentioned earlier, the information on unemployment spells is only available as of January
1987. Consequently, only new spells are identiﬁable in the data. Spells that were ongoing in
January 1987, are classiﬁed as OLF in the ﬁgure.
The bottom portion of the ﬁgure also indicates that the proportion of individuals in JRP
is zero up until approximately January-February 1990. This program was implemented in
August 1989 and had too few participants in the beginning months to show up in the ﬁgure.
Similarly, participation in UI training programs is essentially zero up until February-March
1987. UI training usually occurs after a number of weeks has been spent unemployed. Not
surprisingly, then, a certain laps of time is needed before the proportion of UI trainees is large
enough to show up in the ﬁgure. Training spells that were ongoing in January 1987 are also
classiﬁed as OLF.
A close look at Figure 1 reveals interesting patterns. First, the proportion of welfare partic-
ipants remains relatively constant between 1987 and 1989. The economic downturn of 1989
results in an steady increase in the proportion of welfare claimants until the end of 1993. In
fact, the proportion increased from 17.9% in January 1988 to 42.3% in December 1993. Such
an increase results from both a more important inﬂow into welfare and longer spell duration
[see Duclos, Fortin, Lacroix and Roberge (Forthcoming) for details].
The proportion of employed individuals follows a very distinct seasonal pattern with peak-
s occurring around June-July and troughs around January each year. Despite these seasonal
ﬂuctuations, the proportion of employed individuals increased from 31.2% in January 1988 to
633.5% in January 1990, and then gradually declined to 18.6% in January 1993. The proportion
of unemployed individuals is highly negatively correlated with the proportion of employed in-
dividuals. The seasonal ﬂuctuations almost perfectly mirror those of employment. Finally, the
proportion of individuals in the OLF state also depicts strong seasonal patterns. In January of
each year, the proportion increases by about 5 percentage points. It is likely that many season-
al workers lose their job at the beginning of each year and do not qualify for unemployment
beneﬁts.
The bottom portion of the ﬁgure shows that the proportion of individuals engaged in
government-sponsored training programs ﬂuctuates considerably over time. A number of new
welfare training programs have been implemented in 1989. Most of these programs aim at
enhancing job search skills and usually last a few weeks. The large increase in the proportion
of welfare trainees coincide with the implementation of these programs. A dramatic fall oc-
curs towards the end of 1989 presumably linked to budgetary constraints associated with the
economic downturn of 1990. The proportion of participants steadily increases thereafter and
reaches it highest level at the end of 1993. The proportion of UI trainees is relatively constant
throughout the whole period, with the exception of 1992. Both the UI training programs and
JRP have relatively few participants at any point in time. The proportions of participants in
these programs hardly reaches beyond 5% over the sample period.
The fact that few individuals are engaged in formal training at any point in time is no
indication that training programs are inefﬁcient or unattractive. Access to programs is often
limited because of insufﬁcient resources. This lack of resources raises a fundamental question:
who gets selected into training ? To the econometrician, participation in a training program
is the result of two separate unidentiﬁable processes. First, the participant has undertaken
the necessary steps to take part in the program. Second, the individual responsible for the
management of the program deemed the participant as eligible. These two processes are likely
to be such that participants have unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics that are
systematically different from those of the non-participants. Fortunately, given the information
at our disposal it is possible to devise estimators that, under very general assumptions, will
yield unbiased estimates of the programs’ impacts. These estimators are presented in the next
section.
3 Modeling labour market transitions
The labour market history of a given individual is represented by a sequence of
￿ spells of
various lengths in any of K (=7) states. Let
￿
￿
￿ be the state in which an individual is observed
to be at time







￿ when the individual is 16 years

































Figure 2: Labour market history of a hypothetical individual.
madeupof3spellsofvariouslengthin3differentstates. Asdepicted, theindividualisinitially
observed in the OLF state. He enters into employment at time
￿
￿
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￿ ). Finally, let


























































































































































































































































































￿ , is the same for each individual in our sample and exogenously de-
termined by school attendance laws. Consequently, there is no need to explicitly model the
initial state in which individuals are observed.
3.1 Likelihood function





































> to the likelihood function.
The contribution can be written conditionally on a vector of exogenous variables,












> denote the conditional contribution of the sequence
















































































































































| is a vector of parameters. Naturally, the destination state of the last spell is
unknown since the duration is censored. Its contribution to the conditional likelihood function
is limited to the survivor function of the observed duration.
The random variable
i is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across
individuals, and independent from the exogenous variables
h . If the unobserved heterogeneity
























































































































































































































> is a density probability function and V is the support of
i .
Furthermore, we will assume that
U
?














































































































Given the history of the process, the joint distribution of the duration of spell
￿ and the
destination state only depends on the current state on the labour market. This assumption can
be relaxed by introducing other characteristics of the history of the process.
3.2 Modeling individual spells

































































￿ . We will assume that these
￿ latent durations are independently
distributed.
Thus the duration of spell





































































































































































































































The conditional joint density of the duration of spell
￿ and the destination state
¡ is given


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ . The expression represents the conditional probability that the duration of spell
￿
is at least equal to
- or, equivalently, that all latent durations are at least equal to
- . Therefore,







































































































































￿ is equal to 1 if the individual enters into state
¡ at the end of spell















































So far, the discussion surrounding the unobserved heterogeneity components has voluntarily
been kept general. The use of maximum likelihood procedures requires that we specify dis-
tribution functions for these components. Most applications rely on the work of Heckman
and Singer (1984) and approximate arbitrary continuous distributions using a ﬁnite number
of mass points (see Gritz (1993), Ham and Rea (1987)). More recent papers use richer spec-
iﬁcations that allow the heterogeneity terms to be correlated across states (see Bonnal et al.
(1997), Ham and LaLonde (1996)). These speciﬁcations are sometimes referred to as single
or double-factor loading distributions and are also based on a ﬁnite set of mass points. In our
work, we wish to investigatethe robustness of the parameter estimates to various distributional
assumptions. We will use two and three-factor loading distributions as in the aforementioned
papers. Additionally, we will investigate the consequences on the slope parameters of using
various continuous distributions instead of the usual ﬁnite sets of mass points.











































￿ ). Ideally, the joint distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity terms should not be independent.


































































































































































































































































































































v IR and the probability



















































































































































































£ is the variance of
‰
￿ , j=1,2.
A two-factor loading model with two independent heterogeneity terms with a common





























































































































> are given by the same expression as in (3). In the next section, we will present results
based on various parametric distribution functions (exponential, weibull, log-normal, normal
and student).
The above speciﬁcations can be further generalized to a three-factor loading model with
a common continuous distribution for the unobserved variables. In this speciﬁcation, the



























































































































































































































































































































































































3.4 Speciﬁcation of conditional hazard functions
























the heterogeneity term for destination
¡ , given the individual is in state


























9 if we consider a three-factor loading model.
































































































































































We have considered three alternative conditional speciﬁcations for the baseline hazard
functions. For each transition, we have chosen among the following competing speciﬁcations
on the basis of non-parametric kernel estimations (see Fortin, Fougère and Lacroix (1999a)):
1. Log-logistic Distribution



















































































￿ then the hazard function is decreasing.
2. Piecewise-Constant Hazard Model


















































































































The baselinehazard functioncan be increasingthendecreasing, decreasing then increas-
ing, strictly increasing or strictly decreasing.
3. Weibull Distribution











































































￿ this conditional hazard
function is constant.
143.5 Estimation
We consider three alternative speciﬁcations for unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
1. Two-Factor Loading and Discrete Distribution





















































































> and the ob-




￿ is the size of the sample.
In equation (1)
￿





































































ˇ is a parameter.





x ) in order to obtain the
maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters.
2. Two-Factor Loading and Continuous Distribution


















































































































> . The log-


















> cannot generally be analytically computed it


























































































































































) are assumed to be speciﬁc to the individual. The





















































> is the simulated contribution of the sequence
3
￿
to the likelihood function.
















￿ (see Gourriéroux and
Monfort (1991, 1996)). Under these conditions, this estimator has the same asymptotic
distribution as the standard ML estimator. Following Laroque and Salanié (1993) and
Kamionka (1998) we have used successively 20 draws from the random distributions
when estimating the models. Using as few as 10 draws yielded essentially the same
parameter estimates.
3. Three-Factor Loading And Continuous Distribution
In the three-factor loading model the conditional contribution must be integrated with











































































































































again, the parameter estimates obtained from maximizing this function are asymptoti-
cally efﬁcient.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents the maximum likelihood estimation results of the hazard function frame-
work outlined in the previous section using administrativedata. The estimation of such a com-
plex model is computationally demanding. Also, a number of issues must be addressed before












￿ is the p.d.f. of one of the distributions we have examined (normal, log-normal, exponential, student
and weibull distributions).
164.1 Functional Forms Assumptions
As mentioned in the previous section, it is necessary to specify a baseline distribution function
for each transition considered in the model. When selecting a particular functional form, a
number of desirable properties should be sought. First, the adopted distribution should allow
a number of different shapes of the hazard function so that various combinations of positive
and negative duration dependence are possible. Second, the functional form chosen should
roughly follow the pattern of transitions times found in the data. Finally, the functional forms
should involve as few parameters as possible.
The data at our disposal was analyzed in Fortin et al. (1999a) using non-parametric kernel
hazard estimators. The baseline hazard functions were chosen on the basis of their analysis.
Table 3 reports the functional form used in each of the 24 transitions considered in the model.
Both the log-logistic and the piecewise constant functions allow non-monotonic hazards. For
many transitions, the empirical hazard functions initially increase for a short period of time
and then display an extended period of negative duration dependence. The log-logistic func-
tion is best suited in these cases. When the empirical hazard function looks relatively ﬂat, it is
preferable to use an exponential model with a single parameter. Other non-monotone shapes
are best approximated with the piecewise constant hazard function. Monotone increasing or
decreasing empirical hazard rates can be satisfactorily approximated with a weibull distribu-
tion function.
4.2 Exogenous Covariates
Most studies on labour market transitions include a number of exogenous individual-speciﬁc
and macroeconomic variables. It is thus customary to include variables such as age, sex,
education and minority status to capture behavioural differences across these groups. In this
paper we have tried to limit the number of exogenous control variables as much as possible.
Given the unusually large number of transitions considered in the analysis, including even as
little as 10 exogenous variables would have over-parameterized the likelihood function and
rendered its estimation practically infeasible.
An alternative empirical strategy is to circumscribe the sample to relatively homogeneous
individualsin terms of observablecharacteristics. We haveelected to concentrate our attention
on young and poorly educated men for two reasons: (1) They have fared relatively poorly on
the labour market over the past decade (see Beaudry and Green (1997); (2) As a consequence
of their deteriorating labour market outcomes, they have been targeted for welfare training
programs. Having a relatively homogeneous sample in terms of age and education does not
remove the need to control for such variables explicitly. On the other hand, Gritz (1993)
has found these variables to have no impact whatsoever on any of the transitions considered
17in his model. Furthermore, Bonnal et al. (1997) also uses the same strategy to avoid over-
parameterizing the likelihood function of their model.
The model includes the followingcovariates: minimumwage, unemploymentrate, welfare
beneﬁts, dummy indicators for previous training under either welfare or UI, and the UI basic
beneﬁt rate. The basic beneﬁt rate is the proportion of the insurable earnings that is paid
as beneﬁts. The rate remained constant at 60% between 1987 and April 1993, when it was
reduced to 57%. The minimum wage and the welfare beneﬁts are computed monthly and
deﬂated by the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI). The monthly unemployment rate is
computed for men aged 25-64 for the Province of Québec.
All the variables are computed at the beginning of each spell and are assumed constant
throughout the duration of the spell. While the basic beneﬁt rate only has two distinct values,
its identiﬁcation relies essentially on the fact that spells have different starting dates.
4.3 Parameter Estimates
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of six different speciﬁcations. The table runs over
severalpages. Eachpagefocusesonthe transitionsoutof aparticularstate. Theﬁrst columnof
thetablereportsthe parameterestimates undertheassumption ofnounobservedheterogeneity.
Under this assumption, the transitions out of each state could be estimated separately as a
competing risks model. The speciﬁcation of the second column is a two-factor loading model
based on a ﬁnite number of points of support. This speciﬁcation is typical of those found in
the literature. The next three speciﬁcations of the table are two-factor loading models that use
continuous distributions. The third column uses a log-normal distribution to draw the random
components. Columns 4 and 5 both use weibull distributions, but the latter speciﬁcation also
controls for previous training. Finally, the speciﬁcation of the last column is a tree-factor
loading model that uses a weibull distribution to draw the random components and which also
controls for past training.12
An examination of Table 4 reveals interesting results. Giventhe large number of parameter
estimates, it would be unreasonable to discuss each of them in turn. Instead, we will focus on
the main results pertaining to each state considered in the model.
12The model was also estimated using normal, student-t,
￿
￿
￿ and gamma distributions. These results are not
reported here for the sake of brevity, but are available on request. The preferred speciﬁcations are those based on
the weibull distribution for two reasons. First, as shown in Heckman and Singer (1984) (p. 276) the parameter
estimates based on the weibull distribution are very similar to those based on discrete distributions with a ﬁnite
number of mass points. Given the latter are robust to speciﬁcation errors on the distribution of the heterogeneity
components, the weibull distribution appears to depict similar properties. Second, as in Heckman and Singer
(1984), the values of likelihood function based on the weibull distribution are usually larger than those based on
other distributions.
184.3.1 Exits from Welfare
Asindicatedabove,thecolumnsofTable4arearrangedinanincreasingorderofcomplexityin
terms of unobserved heterogeneityand/or in terms of the number of control variables. The ﬁrst
panel of the table focuses on welfare. Exits to as many as ﬁve different states are considered.
As a rule, the results are very robust to the type of unobserved heterogeneity considered in
the model. The speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst column, i.e. when unobserved heterogeneity is not
accounted for, yields parameter estimates that are signiﬁcantly different from those of other
speciﬁcations.
As expected, increases in welfare beneﬁts decreases the exit rates from welfare. The result
is statistically signiﬁcant in transitions towards training, work and OLF states. Increases in
the unemployment rate translate into increases in the transitions toward welfare training and
OLF, but lower transitions into JRP. This latter result is compatible with the fact that wel-
fare claimants may be motivated to increase their employability when job prospects diminish.
Similarly, ﬁrms may be less inclined to hire trainees under the JRP program when the unem-
ployment rate rises.
Interestingly, increases in the minimum wage rate increases the transitions towardswelfare
training, JRP and unemployment, but has no impact on transitions into employment. This
result is compatible with the results found in a recent paper by Fortin and Lacroix (1997).
In that paper it was found using a similar sample that increases in the minimum wage rate
increased exits from welfare. Since the transition state was not known, this was interpreted as
evidence that ﬁrms were not constrained by the minimum wage rate. Instead, an increase in
the latter was interpreted as attracting a number of welfare claimants onto the labour market.
The results reported here provide a completely differentstory. Indeed, it appears that increases
in the minimum wage rate induce welfare claimants to increase their employability but do not
translate into a larger number being employed. Quite to the contrary, the increased transition
rates from welfare to unemployment suggest that a number of individuals that were working
while claiming welfare beneﬁts may have lost their job following the increase in the minimum
wage rate.
Increases in the basic beneﬁt rate make unemployment, and possibly employment, more
attractive alternatives for welfare claimants. The parameter estimates do not support this con-
jecture since they are either not statistically signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant. On the other
hand, they are negative and statistically signiﬁcant with respect to transitions into welfare
training and OLF. A priori one would have expected these parameter estimates not to be sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Consequently, it not clear how to interpret these results.
Columns 4 and 5 are identical speciﬁcations except for the inclusion of three dummy
indicators for past training in the latter speciﬁcation. These dummy variables are equal to one
19whenever a welfare claimant has experienced at least one training program prior to the current
welfare spell. Implicitly, it is assumed that the impact of past training spells does not wear off
with time nor does it accumulate with repeat uses of training programs.
The inclusion of these dummy variables impacts both the baseline hazard parameters and
the slope parameters somewhat. The parameter estimates reveal several interesting effects of
training on time spent on welfare. First, past occurrences of JRP increases the likelihood of
leaving welfare for welfare training, but decreases the likelihood of entering unemployment
or employment. Likewise, past occurrences of welfare training increases the likelihood of
transiting from welfare to JRP. In order to transit from welfare to unemployment, an individ-
ual must work while claiming beneﬁts. The parameter estimates suggests that these training
programs are perceived to some extent as substitutes to regular jobs by welfare claimants.
The last two columns of the table are identical except for the fact that three loading factors
are used in the last column instead of two. Using a richer speciﬁcation for the unobserved
heterogeneity components marginally decreases the impact of the dummy training variables.
4.3.2 Exits from Unemployment
The next panel of the table focuses on the transitions out of unemployment. Most parameter
estimates that are statistically signiﬁcant have the expected sign a priori. For instance, in-
creases in the minimum wage rate, the unemployment rate and the welfare beneﬁts increase
the likelihood of entering welfare upon leaving unemployment. As indicated lower in the
table, unemployed individuals experience greater difﬁculty entering employment when the
minimum wage rate and the unemployment rate increase. Presumably, a number of them ex-
haust their beneﬁts and enter welfare. This is all the more likely if welfare beneﬁts increase as
well.
Other results presented in the table indicate that unemployed individuals are more likely
to enter a new unemployment spell whenever the unemployment rate increase, but are likely
to do so when the welfare beneﬁts increase. Increases in the minimum wage rate increases
the likelihood of leaving unemployment for unemployment training. This result is similar to
what was found concerning transitions from welfare to welfare training. Finally, the basic
beneﬁt rate is found to increase the transitions from unemployment to welfare and to decrease
transitions toward employment as expected.
A number of parameter estimates relating to the training dummy variables are statistically
signiﬁcant. They indicate that both past welfare and UI training increase the likelihood of en-
tering welfare upon exiting unemployment. On the other hand, past welfare training decreases
the probability of entering employment while past UI training has the opposite effect. This re-
sult is consistent with those found by Fortin, Fougère and Lacroix (1999b) using different data
20and econometric estimators and are also consistent to some extent with those of Gritz (1993)
and Bonnal et al. (1997). In all three cases it was found that participation in government-
sponsored training programs had detrimental effects on the labour market experience of y-
oung men. It has been suggested that potential employers may stigmatize participation in
such training programs. Because these programs are designed to improve the labour market
opportunities of disadvantaged workers, participation in the later may be taken as a signal of
unsatisfactory performance in previous employment. Are results indicate that training while
on welfare is detrimental to men, but training while on unemployment does not convey the
same negative signal.
4.3.3 Exits from Employment
The next panel of the table reports results relating to exits from employment. Once again, most
parameters estimates that are statistically signiﬁcant have the expected sign. In particular, in-
creases in the minimum wage rate is found to increase the likelihood of leaving employment
for either welfare training or unemployment, and to diminish considerably the likelihood of
transiting towards another job. Increases in welfare beneﬁts are found to increase the transi-
tions into welfare and to decrease the likelihood of entering welfare training.
The parameter estimate associated with the unemployment rate has the expected sign ex-
cept perhaps with respect to transitions between employment and unemployment. Indeed, the
parameter estimate implies that whenever the unemployment rate increases, workers are less
likely to leave employment to enter unemployment. There are several potential explanations
for this result. First, it may well be that when the labour market deteriorates, workers who
loose their job have difﬁculty qualify for UI beneﬁts. They are thus more likely to turn to
welfare, as indicated in the top portion of the panel. Second, the deterioration of the labour
market may induce some to hold on to their current jobs longer. The fact that all the parameter
estimates are negative, except for welfare, in consistent with this possibility. Consequently, it
is very likely that employment spells last longer when the unemployment rate increases.
The training dummy variables in the ﬁrst two portions of the panel are deﬁned as in previ-
ous panels. The next three portions of the panel include four training dummy variables. The
ﬁrst of these, Wel. Tr
￿ , is equal to one if the individualhas experienced welfare or JRP training
at any time before the current employment spell. The second dummy variable, Wel. Tr
￿ , is
equal to one if the state just prior to the current employment spell was either welfare or JRP
training. The two other dummy variables, i.e. UI Tr
￿ and UI Tr
￿ , are similarly deﬁned but
relate to UI training. Including these dummy variables enables us to verify the extent to which
the training effects taper off with time.
21The training variables of the ﬁrst two portions of the table show interesting results. For
instance, those who haveparticipated in welfare training are more likely to enter either welfare
or welfare training upon exiting employment. Having participated in JRP decreases substan-
tially the likelihood of re-entering welfare, but alsoincreases the likelihoodof enteringwelfare
training. The last three sections of the panel also reveal interesting results. First, individuals
that were in UI training just prior to their current employment spell are much more likely to
return to UI upon leaving employment. On the other hand, having gone through UI training
programs further in the past has no noticeable effect on this transition. Second, the likelihood
of entering the OLF state following employment decreases substantially if the individual ex-
perienced either UI or welfare training in the past. The impact is greater when welfare training
preceded the employment spell but is not related to the timing of the UI training.
4.3.4 Exits from OLF
The results presented in the following panel relate to the OLF state. Recall that this state
includes individuals that are truly out of the labour force but may also include full-time stu-
dents and non-entitled unemployed workers. Caution must thus be exercised in interpreting
these results. Surprisingly many parameter estimates turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant.
Of particular interest, transitions from OLF to employment appear to be quite sensitive to the
economic environment. Exits from OLF are thus more likely when the beneﬁt rate or the min-
imum wage rate increase, and less likely when either the unemployment rate or the welfare
beneﬁts increase.
The parameter estimates related to the welfare training variables tell a rather disappointing
story. Indeed, past participation in these programs increase the likelihood of entering welfare
or welfare training anew. On the other hand, past participation in JRP decreases both the
likelihood of entering welfare and employment following a spell of inactivity. Incidentally, UI
training has no impact on the exit rates out of OLF.
4.3.5 Exits from Training Programs
The penultimate panel of Table 4 reports parameter estimates relating to training programs.
Exits from the welfare training programs are sensitive to most exogenous variables of the
model. On the other hand, the econometric model does a poorer job at predicting exits from
JRP and UI training programs. In these two cases, only the minimum wage rate has any
explanatory power, albeit with parameter estimates of the expected sign.
224.3.6 Unobserved Heterogeneity
The last panel of the table reports the value of the likelihood function of each speciﬁcation as
well as the parameter estimates relating to the unobserved heterogeneity. The ﬁrst speciﬁca-
tion does not control for unobserved heterogeneity and is thus a special case of all the other
speciﬁcations. It is strongly rejected on the basis of log-likelihood ratio tests. This is hardly
surprising given that the parameter estimates of this speciﬁcation reported in the previous pan-
els were in some cases strikingly different from the those in which unobserved heterogeneity
was controlled for.
Therobustnessoftheparameterestimateswithrespecttothedistributionoftheunobserved
heterogeneity variables can be investigated by comparing columns 2–4 of the previous panels
since these speciﬁcations include the same set of exogenous variables. Apart from a few
cases, the slope parameters are relatively insensitive to the choice of a particular distribution
function. The maindifferencesoccurwithrespecttothe baselinehazardparameters. Bonnalet
al. (1997) also found their results to be relatively insensitive to the distributional assumptions
of the unobserved heterogeneity variables.13 These results are also consistent with the results
of Heckman and Singer (1984) using single durations data.
The speciﬁcation in column 5 is similar to that in column 4, except for the inclusion of
past training variables. A simple likelihood ratio test strongly rejects the model of column
4 in favour of that in column 5. The inclusion of these training dummy variables alters few
slope and baseline hazard parameters, the main differences arising with respect to the OLF
and employment hazards. Finally, note that the three-factor loading model of column 6 nests
the two-loading factor model of column 5.14 A simple log-likelihood ratio test strongly rejects
the two-factor loading model in favour of the three-factor model.
The rejection of the two-factor loading model is relatively surprising given that the s-
lope and baseline hazard parameter estimates of the two speciﬁcations are nearly identical.
However, introducing a third heterogeneity component considerably alters the loading factor
parameters in the rightmost column of the last panel of Table 4. This suggests that the rich-
er speciﬁcation may be better suited to uncover selection into the different states, if any. In
order to investigate this issue, we report in Table 5 the correlation coefﬁcients between the
heterogeneity variables that are implicit in each speciﬁcation along with their standard errors.
The ﬁrst panel is concerned with the non-parametric and the log-normal two-factor loading
models. Both speciﬁcations yield similar coefﬁcients except for correlations involving UI
training. According to these estimates, there is little selectivity into the welfare training pro-
grams. Indeed, those who are more likely to experience such programs are no more likely to
13In their work, they compare a two-factor loading model with ﬁnite points of support with a single-factor










































23be employed or unemployed, although they are more likely to be in the OLF state. On the oth-
er hand, there appears to be considerable selectivity into JRP. Indeed, the correlation between
JRP, employment and unemployment are very large and signiﬁcant, whereas the correlation
between JRP and OLF is large and negative. Such selection may reﬂect individual preferences
but may also reﬂect selectivity on the part of program administrators.
The next panel of Table 5 reports the correlation coefﬁcients of the two-factor loading
models based on the weibull distribution function. The two sections of the panel only differ
insofar as the speciﬁcation of the lower portion includes training dummy variables. Note ﬁrst
that the correlation coefﬁcients are nearly identical to those of the log-normal distribution of
the previous panel. The only difference concerns the correlation coefﬁcient between welfare
training and OLF which is not statistically different, and which reinforces the idea that there
appears to be no selectivity into these programs. Note also that the correlation coefﬁcients that
are statistically signiﬁcant are nearly identical between the two sections of the panel.
The last panel of Table 5 focuses on the correlation coefﬁcients implicit in the three-factor
loading model. Each section of the panel is related to the correlation coefﬁcients in equations
(4)–(5), respectively. Hence, the ﬁrst section is identical to the previous panels. The correla-
tion coefﬁcients reported in this section differ considerably from the previous ones. According
to the estimates, it now appears that there is considerable selectivity into welfare training. In-
deed, those who are more likely to participate in these programs are also less likely to train
under JRP and also to ﬁnd employment. This is in stark contrast with the previous results.
Other correlation coefﬁcients are relatively similar to the previous ones.
The second section of the panel reports the correlation coefﬁcients with respect to the
origin states. Large heterogeneity values in the origin state translate into short spell durations.
Consequently, the correlations reﬂect the frequency with which individuals transit across the
various states. The estimates show that individuals who are more likely to have short welfare
training spells are also likely to have long JRP spells. Similarly, long welfare training spells
are correlated to long OLF spells, whereas to converse applies to JRP spells.
The last section of the panel reports the implicit correlations between the origin and the
destination states. Note that the correlation matrix need not be symmetric nor does the diag-
onal need be equal to unity. On the other hand, the restrictions that were imposed to achieve
identiﬁcation of the loading parameters imply that the ﬁrst row of the matrix is equal to the
ﬁrst row of the matrix of the middle section.
For the sake of brevity we will focus our attention on the most interesting correlations.
The estimates suggest that those who are more likely to have long welfare spells are less likely
to enter welfare training and more likely to enter JRP (row 1). On the other hand, those who
are likely to have long welfare training spells are also likely to transit through welfare and to
return to welfare training, but much less likely to transit through JRP (row 2). Similarly, row 3
24indicates that individuals who are likely to have long JRP spells are likely to return eventually
to JRP but are also much less likely to return to either welfare or welfare training in the future.
The correlations presented in Table 5 clearly indicate that participation in either welfare
training programs or JRP is strongly correlated to unobservable characteristics. The estimates
also suggest that participants in JRP are systematically different from those who participate in
welfare training programs. Finally, we ﬁnd very little evidence of selection bias into the UI
training programs.
5 Conclusion
The analysis has focused on an examination of the impact of government-sponsored training
programs aimed at disadvantaged male youths on their labour market transitions. We have
elected to concentrate our attention on this group since they have fared relatively poorly on
the labour market over the past decade in Canada by all accounts. The richness of the data at
our disposal has allowed us to recreate very detailed individual histories over a relatively long
period. As many as seven distinct states on the labour could be identiﬁed in the data.
This study has applied a continuous time duration model to estimate the density of du-
ration times in these seven states, controlling for the endogeneity of an individual’s training
status. Most previous studies have used survey or administrative data that were less amenable
to the kind of analysis performed in this paper. Depending on the nature of the data, complex
adjustments to the model were often required to account for potential problems related to s-
tock sampling and initial conditions. Fortunately, we were able to avoid these difﬁculties by
recreating each individual’s history as early as age 16, the legal school-leaving age in Cana-
da. Consequently, the initial state can be safely considered exogenous, and the subsequent
duration times void of any form of bias.
There is no consensus in the literature concerning the appropriate treatment of unobserved
heterogeneity in multi-states multi-episodes duration models. When few states are considered,
two-factor loading models with a ﬁnite set of points of support have become relatively stan-
dard. When the analysis focuses on more states, factor loading models require a large number
of parameters to be ﬂexible or become relatively restrictive if a parsimonious speciﬁcation is
used. In this paper we have chosen to investigate the sensitivity of the parameter estimates by
comparing a typical non-parametric speciﬁcation and a series of parametric two-factor loading
models. These models have assumed that the intensity of transitions were related to the state
of destination. We have also estimated a parametric three-factor loading model. The novelty
of this speciﬁcation lies in the fact that the intensities of transitions are related to both to the
state of destination and the state of origin.
25The estimation of the model yields a number of interesting results. As found in previous
studies, unobserved heterogeneity appears to play an important role in determining who se-
lects or gets selected in training programs. On the other hand, the slope and baseline hazard
parameter estimates are not very sensitive to the choice of a particular distribution function
for the unobserved heterogeneity variables. The two-factor loading models yield essentially
the same results. These show that the duration times in any of the seven states considered are
sensitive to variations in program parameters such as welfare beneﬁts, minimum wage rate,
UI basic beneﬁt rate and the unemployment rate. Nearly all the parameter estimates have the
expected sign when statistically signiﬁcant.
The results pertaining to the impact of the training programs are similar to those found ear-
lier by Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1997) and Fortin et al. (1999a). In essence, young, poorly
educatedmales who participatein welfare training programsdo far worse on the labourmarket
than those who do not participate. Participation in the Job Re-Entry Program, a distinct wel-
fare training programs, yields better results in terms of employment. Participants also appear
to return much less to welfare than those who use standard welfare training programs. Finally,
participation in a UI related training program yields positive results in terms of employment,
but it also raises the likelihood of experiencing both welfare and welfare spells.
Our estimates clearly indicate that participation in the training programs is deﬁnitely re-
lated to unobservable characteristics. More interestingly, they stress that participants in JRP
and those in welfare training programs are distinct groups. To the extent we have adequately
accounted for such selectivity, the measured impacts of the various training programs should
not be contaminated by selectivity biases.
There are a number of extensions to the empirical results presented above that warrant fur-
ther investigation. Certainly, it would be preferable eventually to control explicitly for age and
schooling levels. Although we have selected our sample so as to limit the extent of variations
in these variables, not controlling explicitly for them may amplify the impact of unobserved
heterogeneity. Secondly, the exogenous variables are all measured at the beginning of each
spell, as is customary in the literature. A more satisfactory strategy presumably would be to
make these variables time dependent, given that some spells are relatively lengthy. Finally, it
would be interesting to compare these results with those based on a similar sample of women.
It is generally acknowledge that young female cohorts have performed relatively better than
comparable male cohorts in Canada over our sample period. The results reported in this paper
suggest that these extensions may well be worth pursuing.
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Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Individual without training
Age when entering the sample 19.92 1.84
Education 9.84 1.03
Duration of employment episodes (weeks)
￿
26.15 30.47
Duration of welfare episodes (weeks)
￿
35.63 34.43
Duration of unemployment episodes (weeks)
￿
39.90 11.99
Duration of OLF episodes (weeks)
￿
42.99 50.95
Proportion of time employed (weeks)
￿
0.18
Number of observations 1165
Individual with training
Age when entering the sample 19.77 (1.95)
Education 9.72 (1.03)
Before training After training
Duration of employment episodes (weeks)
￿
24.26 37.13 17.44 18.25
Duration of welfare episodes (weeks)
￿
54.90 54.86 35.14 51.09
Duration of unemployment episodes (weeks)
￿
41.25 14.41 35.73 16.83
Duration of OLF episodes (weeks)
￿
30.78 38.86 18.66 21.16
Proportion of time employed (weeks)
￿
0.17 0.16
Number of observations 1903
￿
Calculated from non censored episodes.
￿
Calculated from mean duration in employment, unemployment, welfare and OLF.
Table 2
Frequency of Transitions Between States
Destination Welfare Welfare JRP U.I. U.I. Employment OLF
Origin Training Training
Welfare 0 1809 140 88 0 1851 1134
Welfare Training 432 0 67 6 0 438 306
JRP 21 4 0 7 0 192 29
U.I. 374 38 2 292 111 1380 1404
U.I. Training 2 1 0 114 0 16 2
Employment 1002 229 35 2918 41 2004 4662
OLF 2614 235 9 523 2 3815 0Table 3
Baseline Hazard Functional Forms
￿
Dest. Welfare Welfare JRP U.I. U.I. Emp. OLF
Origin Training Training
Welfare Exp (1) Exp (1) Exp (1) Exp (3) Exp (1)
Wel Tr Log-logis. Log-logis. Log-logis.
JRP Exp (1)
U.I. Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (1) Exp (3) Exp (2)
U.I. Tr Exp (1)
Emp Log-logis. Weibull Log-logis. Log-logis. Log-logis.
OLF Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (2) Exp (2)
￿
“Exp” refers to exponential piecewise constant hazard model. The number of parameters are indicated be-
tween parentheses.Table 4
Parameter Estimates – Exits from Welfare
No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
2 Factors 2 Factors 3 Factors




















































































































￿ 2.275 0.160 -5.840 -6.134 -3.910 -3.511
Replacement -30.577
￿
















-0.399 -0.446 -0.451 -0.568 -0.547
Welfare Ben. 1.579
￿


























-2.253 -2.580 -1.941 -1.910
Replacement -0.201 -2.715 -2.268 -2.469 -3.464 -2.834
Minimum Wage 6.019
￿
-0.608 -0.470 -0.447 -0.345 -0.266
Unemp Rate -0.322
￿


































































￿ Exponential hazard – splines.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous welfare training.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous JRP.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous U.I. training.Table 4 (Continued)
Parameter Estimates – Exits from Unemployment
No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull






















































































-1.743 -7.615 -7.912 -7.524 -7.390
-16.030
￿
2.695 -3.168 -3.473 -3.016 -2.884
Replacement 3.966 -1.913 -1.024 -1.382 -1.547 -1.442
Minimum Wage 22.232
￿


































Unemployment to Unemployment Training
Baseline
￿ -2.325 -6.534 -10.807 -10.988 -10.621 -10.482
Replacement -15.630
￿
-4.039 -4.201 -4.171 -5.389 -5.474










Unemp Rate 1.758 0.329 0.311 0.299 0.202 0.210



















































-0.266 -0.225 -0.235 -0.277 -0.269
Welfare Ben. -0.683
￿


















































2.008 2.358 2.402 2.015 1.984
Unemp Rate -0.054 -0.236 -0.295 -0.305 -0.271 -0.252
Welfare Ben. -0.284 -0.390 -0.406 -0.396 -0.378 -0.361







￿ Exponential hazard – splines.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous welfare training.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous JRP.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous U.I. training.Table 4 (Continued)
Parameter Estimates – Exits from Employment
No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
















































































7.320 5.564 5.571 2.880 3.647
3.352
￿





















































































































































































Welfare Ben. 0.013 -0.285
￿































































































￿ Dummy indicator for any previous welfare training.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous JRP.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous U.I. training.
Dummy indicator for prior state: welfare training.
Dummy indicator for prior state: U.I. training.Table 4 (Continued)
Parameter Estimates – Exits from OLF
No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull















































































































































































































































































































￿ Exponential hazard – splines.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous welfare training.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous JRP.
￿ Dummy indicator for any previous U.I. training.Table 4 (Continued)
Parameter Estimates – Exits from Training
No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull
2 Factors 2 Factors 3 Factors




























































Welfare Ben. 0.325 0.131 0.287 0.277 0.277 0.158


















































































































Unemp Rate -0.483 -0.515 -0.430 -0.430 -0.439 -0.486
Welfare Ben. -0.219 -0.012 -0.014 0.024 0.021 -0.108
JRP to Work
Baseline
￿ 3.612 5.668 -3.143 -2.889 -3.037 -4.420
Replacement -14.331
￿
-8.461 -5.173 -5.844 -5.767 -5.134
Minimum Wage 6.240 9.809 11.792 11.488 11.655 11.941
￿
Unemp Rate -0.276 -0.877 -1.024 -1.035 -1.047 -1.104
Welfare Ben. -0.581 -1.467 -1.438 -1.731 -1.731 -0.670

















Unemp Rate 0.480 1.571
￿
1.452 1.525 1.559 1.544
Welfare Ben. -0.084 0.369 0.157 0.231 0.213 0.506
￿ Log-logistic.
￿ Exponential hazard.Table 4 (Continued)
Heterogeneity Parameters
No Het Non-Para Log-Normal Weibull Weibull Weibull














































































































Log-likelihood -150668.6 -149774.2 -149847.8 -149818.9 -149474.8 149422.6
￿
Statistically signiﬁcant at 5%
￿
Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%Table 5
Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL – NON-PARAMETRIC
Welfare 1.000 -0.157 0.982 0.954 0.875 0.962 -0.850
(0.195) (0.010) (0.010) (0.236) (0.007) (0.023)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 0.035 0.145 0.340 0.118 0.653
(0.200) (0.197) (0.495) (0.196) (0.150)
JRP 1.000 0.994 0.952 0.997 -0.734
(0.006) (0.151) (0.004) (0.051)
UI 1.000 0.980 1.000 -0.654
(0.098) (0.001) (0.052)




TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL – LOG-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
Welfare 1.000 -0.216 0.992 0.984 0.408 0.984 -0.929
(0.263) (0.004) (0.004) (1.680) (0.004) (0.015)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.089 -0.036 0.803 -0.037 0.563
(0.271) (0.272) (1.108) (0.272) (0.221)
JRP 1.000 0.999 0.521 0.999 -0.874
(0.002) (1.571) (0.002) (0.029)
U.I. 1.000 0.566 1.000 -0.846
(1.516) (0.000) (0.032)




Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
TWO-FACTOR LOADING MODEL
WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION - NO DUMMY INDICATORS
Welfare 1.000 -0.343 0.993 0.987 0.237 0.988 -0.947
(0.266) (0.004) (0.004) (2.413) (0.003) (0.012)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.228 -0.189 0.832 -0.195 0.627
(0.278) (0.281) (1.390) (0.280) (0.218)
JRP 1.000 0.999 0.351 0.999 -0.901
(0.001) (2.325) (0.001) (0.026)
U.I. 1.000 0.388 1.000 -0.883
(2.288) (0.027)





WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION - WITH DUMMY INDICATORS
Welfare 1.000 -0.181 0.993 0.987 -0.737 0.987 -0.945
(0.337) (0.004) (0.004) (0.943) (0.003) (0.013)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.061 -0.018 0.798 -0.021 0.494
(0.341) (0.344) (0.872) (0.344) (0.296)
JRP 1.000 0.999 -0.650 0.999 -0.898
(0.002) (1.062) (0.001) (0.027)
U.I. 1.000 -0.617 1.000 -0.878
(1.098) (0.000) (0.028)




Correlations Between Heterogeneity Variables
Three-Factor Loading Model
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Welfare Welf. Tr. JRP UI UI Tr. Employ. OLF
CORRELATION BETWEEN DESTINATION STATES
Welfare 1.000 -0.948 0.993 0.994 -0.861 0.992 -0.980
(0.026) (0.006) (0.002) (0.568) (0.002) (0.007)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.902 -0.906 0.978 -0.899 0.992
(0.042) (0.038) (0.232) (0.040) (0.007)
JRP 1.000 0.998 -0.792 0.998 -0.948
(0.001) (0.682) (0.000) (0.020)
UI 1.000 -0.798 0.999 -0.951
(0.672) (0.001) (0.014)




CORRELATION BETWEEN ORIGIN STATES
Welfare 1.000 0.951 -0.990 0.316 -0.993 -0.401 0.594
(0.027) (0.006) (0.756) (0.006) (0.369) (0.197)
Wel. Tr. 1.000 -0.900 0.592 -0.909 -0.099 0.812
(0.046) (0.622) (0.045) (0.374) (0.123)
JRP 1.000 -0.181 1.000 0.524 -0.476
(0.784) (0.002) (0.346) (0.223)
U.I. 1.000 -0.204 0.743 0.951
(0.782) (0.467) (0.225)




CORRELATION BETWEEN ORIGIN-DESTINATION STATES
Welfare 1.000 0.951 -0.990 0.316 -0.993 -0.401 0.594
(0.027) (0.006) (0.756) (0.006) (0.369) (0.197)
Wel. Tr. -0.948 -0.902 0.939 -0.299 0.942 0.380 -0.563
(0.026) (0.044) (0.028) (0.720) (0.028) (0.345) (0.197)
JRP 0.993 0.944 -0.983 0.313 -0.986 -0.398 0.589
(0.006) (0.028) (0.009) (0.751) (0.009) (0.367) (0.196)
UI 0.994 0.946 -0.984 0.314 -0.987 -0.398 0.590
(0.002) (0.028) (0.007) (0.751) (0.007) (0.367) (0.196)
UI Tr. -0.861 -0.819 0.852 -0.272 0.855 0.345 -0.511
(0.568) (0.544) (0.563) (0.725) (0.565) (0.367) (0.395)
Emplo. 0.992 0.944 -0.982 0.313 -0.985 -0.397 0.589
(0.002) (0.028) (0.007) (0.750) (0.007) (0.366) (0.196)
OLF -0.980 -0.932 0.970 -0.309 0.973 0.392 -0.582
(0.007) (0.031) (0.010) (0.742) (0.010) (0.360) (0.196)